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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of third-party litigation finance introduces a new 
gatekeeper to the legal process. Before deciding to lend money to a 
plaintiff, a litigation finance company will conduct at least some 
review and make an assessment of the quality of the case.1 Since 
* Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A.,
Amherst College. 
 **  Principal Research Scientist, CNA. Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., Princeton 
University. 
1. See generally Nicholas Dietsch, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and
Australia: How the Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687, 687–88 
(2011) (providing an overview of how litigation finance works). 
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litigation finance loans are generally nonrecourse,2 a litigation finance 
company is likely to refuse to loan money to plaintiffs with the 
weakest cases. Such voluntary claim screening may improve social 
welfare by reducing the incidence of frivolous claims. But the volume 
of frivolous claims may still be higher than it would be in a world 
without third-party litigation finance. In particular, third-party 
litigation finance companies, which lend money to litigants to enable 
them to pursue cases, might sometimes finance claims that would 
have a very low probability of prevailing at trial on the assumption 
that such claims may encourage nuisance settlements.3 This danger 
may be greater than when a plaintiff self-finances, because the 
provision of outside financing may help make credible a threat to 
proceed to trial in the absence of a settlement.4 This possibility makes 
the social welfare consequences of alternative litigation finance an 
empirical question. Surely, many financed claims will be meritorious, 
in the probabilistic sense that if the plaintiffs were to receive 
financing, they would be more likely than not to win at trial. It is 
uncertain, however, whether the beneficial economic effects of 
enabling such claims outweigh the negative effects of facilitating 
claims that courts are highly likely to reject. The answer may vary 
based on the type of claim or the type of litigation finance 
arrangement. 
2. See Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and
Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 708–09 n.8 (2007) (quoting litigation finance 
contracts provisions guaranteeing that loans are nonrecourse, meaning that they are not secured 
by other assets).  
3. See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to the
Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 627–29 (2012) (discussing how rational, 
self-interested financiers would invest in a frivolous lawsuit because there is a “chance that a 
claim will slip through” and lead to a settlement offer); Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott 
Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-Party Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice 
System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 662–65 (2012) (explaining how an increase in the supply of 
third-party financing may contribute to increases in speculative litigation on the margin). But see 
Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance 
Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 518–19 (2006) (providing a rebuttal 
to assertions that the litigation finance industry promotes frivolous litigation). In a nascent 
litigation finance industry, it is unlikely that many cases will be frivolous because the earliest 
recipients of funding are likely to be those with the strongest cases. But as the industry grows, 
the danger will become more serious. 
4. A provision of outside funding can be a mechanism by which a plaintiff “ties its hands.”
See generally Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 
1811 (1997) (describing how litigants might face conflict between their ex ante and ex post 
preferences). If the defendant knows that the plaintiff does not care about the cost of trial, then it 
may offer more advantageous settlement offers. Thus, the litigation finance company may agree 
to contracts generously assuring plaintiffs continued funding because the company and the 
plaintiff share in the benefits of the increased credibility.  
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Although unregulated third-party financing might lead to more 
nuisance claims, a regulated system could be structured to block the 
financing of many nuisance claims without also blocking stronger 
claims. The legal system might use accumulated empirical evidence to 
make case-by-case estimates of case quality and bar financing in cases 
in which the measure of case quality is below some predetermined 
threshold. These case-by-case estimates would depend on the area of 
law, the specific attributes of the claim, and the terms of the proposed 
litigation financing arrangement, with higher interest rates signaling 
a relatively weak claim. If detailed regression data were available, a 
statistical formula could be devised that would assign a preliminary 
estimate of the probability that the claim would prevail. Under this 
system, the law would provide that claims below a certain probability 
threshold could proceed only in the absence of litigation financing. 
Even absent a sufficient amount of data to conduct regression 
studies, one could devise legal rules that take advantage of the finance 
company’s expertise in separating relatively strong claims from 
relatively weak ones. For example, the law could allow litigation 
financing, but only if the finance company and the defendant agree 
that the loser will pay the winner’s costs.5 Then, the litigation finance 
company would be on the hook for the other side’s fees if it loses at 
trial; however, if its client prevails, then the finance company would 
be refunded whatever money it spent on the litigation, plus interest 
payments from its client. A litigation finance company would only 
agree to such a regime if it is sufficiently confident in its client’s 
claims. The demonstration of a company’s faith in the merits of its 
client’s claims, combined with the tendency of fee-shifting rules to 
increase the cost of litigation,6 might lead many defendants to decline 
the loser-pays option. Regardless, the mere possibility of such fee 
shifting might help separate strong and weak claims. A weaker 
version of this rule would require the loser to pay only some fraction of 
the winner’s costs; a stronger version would require the loser to pay a 
multiple of the winner’s costs.7 The degree of claim screening will 
 
 5. In general, parties do not opt into or out of fee-shifting rules. See John J. Donohue III, 
Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who 
Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1093–95 (1991) (discussing the differences between the British 
rule and American rule for fee shifting). A legal rule explicitly requiring a party to offer to opt 
into the British rule would, however, likely change this since the other party would not believe 
that the offering party was suggesting the British rule for personal advantage. 
 6. See, e.g., Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really 
Cheaper?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 144 (1987) (suggesting that a change to the English rule 
would increase the amount expended per lawsuit). 
 7. The fee-shifting literature has recognized that even if it is desirable that the losing 
party make a payment to the winning party, the optimal amount of money that the losing party 
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increase as the fraction or multiple increases.8 Fee shifting thus 
provides a flexible mechanism that can be adjusted based on the 
amount of gatekeeping desired. 
We suggest that the legal system allow some claims to proceed 
and bar others based on signals of litigation quality gleaned from 
third-party assessments. This proposal may seem radical. These third-
party assessments are based on information about the quality of the 
claim that is preliminary and extrajudicial. Thus, the legal system 
would be allowing some claims to proceed and barring others based on 
a very noisy signal of claim quality, rather than on some form of 
adjudication. In this article, we take on the objection that the legal 
system should not use proxies in this manner. We argue that 
whenever the legal system has some signal of the quality of a 
plaintiff’s case, even if the signal is a noisy one, there is some 
estimated level below which the legal system should block the claim 
through a procedure akin to summary judgment. We also show that 
there is some level above which the legal system should block a 
defense of this claim. Our arguments apply to all signals of claim 
quality, not just the signals that arise from litigation finance. But the 
argument is particularly relevant in the context of litigation finance 
for two reasons: First, litigation finance necessarily introduces a 
gatekeeper into the litigation process. Second, because restrictions on 
litigation finance already exist, rules limiting litigation finance—for 
example, the aforementioned rule requiring a fee-shifting 
arrangement—seem unlikely to offend due process. Other potential 
applications of our argument would be much more likely to encounter 
due process objections, especially in the United States. 
Our approach of using a gatekeeper to discourage frivolous 
claims differs in a significant way from the existing economic 
literature. Authors who propose mechanisms to discourage 
unmeritorious suits (and unmeritorious defenses of suits) have 
 
should pay to the winning party might differ from the amount of legal fees. See A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of 
Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs, 27 RAND J. ECON. 269, 277 (1996) (noting that neither “the 
implicit award nor the implicit penalty under the British rule necessarily corresponds closely to 
the optimal award and penalty”). 
 8.  If the litigation finance company were certain of winning should the case go to trial, 
then it would be guaranteed to receive its reasonable fees, and it would accept a case at an 
interest rate sufficient only to compensate it for the discounted value of its time. At lower levels 
of confidence, whether the litigation finance company would take a case would depend on the 
interest rate on the probability that the defendant would agree to fee shifting and on the 
magnitude of fee shifting. It is beyond the scope of this Article to calculate the optimal fraction or 
multiple. The point is that at any given fraction or multiple, a litigation finance company would 
provide a signal of its confidence in the litigation.  
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generally focused on imposing penalties after suits are resolved. For 
example, under Polinsky and Rubinfeld’s model,9 courts would 
determine whether to impose sanctions for a frivolous suit only after 
the underlying proceeding has concluded. Similarly, the British Rule 
for attorneys’ fees is often called the “loser pays” rule because any fee 
shifting depends on the outcome of the lawsuit.10 An exception in the 
literature is the “sincerity rule” proposed by David Anderson.11 Under 
this rule, a party may give the other a take-it-or-leave-it settlement 
offer, and if the other side declines, the offeror must pay the other 
party’s trial costs. Because settlement will be completely prohibited 
later, the offeree will accept the offer if it is greater than what the 
offeree expects to receive at trial. Even this mechanism, however, does 
not take into account any information from third-party assessments 
about the strength of the suit. 
This Article proposes screening legal claims based on ex ante 
assessments of lawsuit quality. Under claim screening, if an ex ante 
signal indicates that a plaintiff’s probability of success is sufficiently 
low, the plaintiff will not be permitted to bring the claim. We label this 
“pro-defendant screening,” but we also consider “pro-plaintiff 
screening.” Under pro-plaintiff screening, if the ex ante signal 
indicates that a plaintiff’s probability of success is sufficiently high, 
the defendant is not permitted to defend the claim. 
This proposal does not depend on trial costs; however, as we 
will show, the case for it is strengthened when litigation is expensive. 
Rather, the argument is based on a core trade-off. On one hand, 
reliance on a noisy signal sacrifices potentially better information that 
may develop at trial. On the other hand, trials are generally one-shot 
affairs. It is not feasible to repeat a trial many times, with different 
judges and juries; thus, a trial reveals only what a particular judge 
and jury decided, not what most would decide. When a signal suggests 
that the plaintiff’s estimated probability of victory is very small, the 
danger that the signal is inaccurate may be less than the danger that 
a single trial will result in an idiosyncratic outcome. Even if trials 
 
 9. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An 
Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 404 (1993) (describing the frivolous-suit model). 
 10. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit and Settlement vs. Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under 
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 55 (1982) (describing 
the British system whereby the losing side bears all costs). Even Professors Bebchuck and 
Chang’s innovative formulation would shift fees only when the margin of victory is sufficiently 
large, fee shifting depends on the trial outcome. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, 
An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious 
Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 396 (1996). 
 11. David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 225, 240–41 (1994) (defining the “sincerity rule”). 
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were costless, automatic resolution of the lawsuit would be preferable 
to a one-shot trial if the signals were sufficiently extreme. When the 
signal value is closer to the center of the probability continuum, 
however, a trial is preferable. 
A claim-screening device can also be valuable when it causes 
litigation to be settled preemptively. In the absence of pro-defendant 
claim screening, for example, plaintiffs might sometimes bring suits 
with a low probability of victory, either because damages are 
sufficiently high to make the suits valuable, or because the 
expectation of extracting a settlement makes the suits worthwhile 
despite their negative expected value.12 A claim-screening device 
would reduce plaintiffs’ incentives to bring and maintain such suits or 
encourage plaintiffs to settle such suits for even smaller amounts. A 
defendant ordinarily might be willing to pay $5 million to settle a 
claim from a plaintiff who has a 5% chance of winning $100 million, 
but perhaps not if the claim-screening mechanism will prevent the 
claim from going to trial anyway. Thus, claim screening may be 
desirable even if it affects only those cases that would most likely 
settle anyway.13 
Our results reinforce the value of forcing or encouraging all-or-
nothing rather than compromise resolutions to lawsuits. David Kaye 
defended the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard on similar 
grounds against an alternative that would allow damages based on 
the probability of victory.14 If the probability that a defendant will be 
found liable is 0.75, then the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
would provide 100% damages while a probabilistic approach would 
provide 75% damages. The question is thus whether it is efficient to 
grant the additional 25% in damages, and Kaye’s point is that there is 
a 0.75 probability that these additional damages are justified. Kaye 
 
 12. For an assessment of why plaintiffs might bring negative-expected-value suits, see 
Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 537–42 (1997). 
 13. Low-probability cases are particularly likely to settle when the actual probability of a 
plaintiff’s success is near an end of the probability continuum because it is less likely that the 
estimates of the probability of victory will be sufficiently asymmetric to justify going to trial. 
Donohue, for example, conjectures that suits will generally go to trial only if the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s estimates of the probability of victory differ by more than 0.50. See John J. Donohue 
III, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, 
Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 204–05 (1991) (detailing the 
significance of the 0.5 value). This is more likely if the actual probability is in the middle of the 
probability spectrum than if the actual probability is near the ends, for example 0.05 or 0.95. See 
id. 
 14. See David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably 
Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 502 
(analogizing the rule to maximum likelihood, which “makes a few expensive mistakes, but it does 
not err at all in most cases”). 
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concludes that the optimal damages function is discontinuous, with no 
damages for a perceived probability of liability below 0.5 and full 
damages for everything else. Although Kaye focused on damage 
awards at trial, the same logic applies to settlements in the shadow of 
a trial. Indeed, assuming that the vast majority of cases settle, Kaye’s 
system will accomplish little. If the probability that a defendant will 
be found liable approximates the probability that a defendant should 
be found liable, then settlement amounts will resemble the outcomes 
that would occur in a proportional damages regime. For example, if 
60% of courts would find a defendant liable and there is roughly a 60% 
chance that the defendant should be found liable, then Kaye would 
recommend 100% damages, but settlement would likely result in 
compromise. Claim screening provides an antidote, pushing in the 
direction of all-or-nothing results. In the analysis that follows, claim 
screening applies to suits at the time of filing or shortly thereafter. Of 
course, if universal claim screening were thought too expensive, it 
could be applied shortly before trial. Then, as long as claim screening 
is sufficiently cheaper than trial, overall costs will likely be reduced. 
The anticipation of such claim screening would still deter some 
frivolous suits and defenses, though we expect that the benefits of 
claim screening would be reduced as well. 
The argument proceeds as follows. In Part II.A, we offer a 
simple mathematical model. Initially, the analysis assumes that the 
number of truly liable and truly not liable cases are equal, and that 
false positives are as costly as false negatives. Under this assumption 
(among others), there exists some threshold signal value below which 
social welfare will be raised by barring plaintiffs’ suits, and some other 
threshold above which social welfare will be raised by automatically 
resolving the liability issue in favor of the plaintiff. Even if this 
assumption is relaxed, one-sided claim screening will still be useful. 
We show in Part II.B that our conclusions are only strengthened once 
trial costs are factored in. The higher the trial costs, the closer the 
optimal thresholds for claim screening will be to the middle of the 
probability distribution. 
To obtain a better appreciation for plausible values of these 
thresholds given different signal strengths and to incorporate the 
dynamics of settlement into our analysis, we offer a simulation model 
in Part III. The simulation suggests that, under plausible 
assumptions, the optimal thresholds for claim screening are 
surprisingly close to 0.50. We show that this result is robust to a 
variety of changes in assumptions. For example, the 0.50 threshold is 
optimal whether the third-party signal is strong or quite weak, 
whether the parties are relatively good or bad at estimating the 
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strength of the claim, and whether one party has better information 
than another. Lowering or raising the parties’ trial costs, even if that 
creates asymmetric trial costs, does not alter this conclusion. The most 
important question may be how costly the signal is to obtain; however, 
claim screening may well be economical as long as it is cheaper than 
the trials that it will sometimes replace. When the plaintiff opts for 
litigation financing, the finance companies will perform a gatekeeping 
function anyway, and screening should not pose a significant 
additional cost. 
We believe that these results will tend to understate the value 
of claim screening for two reasons. First, we suspect that there are 
many more low-probability claims than claims near the middle of the 
probability distribution. It is easier to develop legal theories that have 
only a small chance of prevailing than to develop successful legal 
theories. Lawyers should prefer strong cases to weak ones, all else 
being equal, but the existing legal system may encourage the filing of 
low-probability “strike suits” with high damage claims in the hope of 
settlement. Empirical evidence supports the notion that such suits 
(e.g., derivative actions) usually fail when tried.15 Second, our results 
use a fixed pool of cases. But if our approach increases litigation 
accuracy, then parties may improve their behavior in response, 
reducing the probability of litigation and changing the pool of cases. 
For example, defendants may be more likely to take efficient 
precautions if legal accuracy increases.16 We do not explicitly model 
this. Our approach is general across litigation and not limited to the 
context of torts; we do not wish to limit the analysis by focusing only 
on areas of law in which the court assesses whether the defendant has 
taken sufficient precautions. 
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
Consider a set of cases where the correct finding is either 
liability or no liability. Suppose for any given case that we do not 
observe the correct finding ex ante but receive a signal of the 
proportion of judges who would assign liability. If judges are more 
likely to be right than wrong over the set of all cases, we should 
employ claim screening rather than traditional adjudication in cases 
with a sufficiently strong signal. To appreciate this intuition, consider 
 
 15. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 55, 60 (1991) (finding that shareholder plaintiffs have “abysmal success in court”). 
 16. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. 
& ECON. 1, 2–3 (1994) (describing how higher levels of accuracy will increase deterrence). 
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two extreme possibilities: a perfect signal and a signal containing no 
information at all. With the perfect signal, adjudication is worthless 
because the signal reveals the majority of judges’ decisions and, 
consequently, the true merit of the case (under our assumptions of 
aggregate judicial accuracy). For example, suppose a signal indicates 
with certainty that 75% of judges would impose liability after hearing 
all the evidence. This implies that the correct decision is to impose 
liability, and relying on this perfect signal to find automatic liability 
would lead to the correct resolution. Adjudication would introduce an 
unnecessary 25% risk of an incorrect resolution. On the other hand, a 
signal containing no information at all (such as a coin flip) is 
worthless. Relying on it would produce only a 50% chance of arriving 
at the correct answer. Since judges are right more than they are 
wrong, adjudication can do better than this. 
A. An Illustration 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of claim screening’s potential 
benefits and costs for defendants, reflecting the intuition and 
structure of our formal model. Figure 1 illustrates a particular set of 
cases. In each case, the correct finding is either “liability” (denoted L¯ ) 
or “no liability” (denoted NL¯¯  ). However, since judges estimate L¯  and 
NL¯¯  with error, we use L and NL to denote the actual resolution of the 
cases. 
FNL|NL¯¯  (s) denotes an arbitrarily defined cumulative 
distribution function (“CDF”) of signal values s for cases in which the 
correct finding is not liability. Thus, FNL|NL¯¯  (s) is the proportion of 
truly not liable cases that would automatically (and correctly) be 
dismissed under a claim screening mechanism if the threshold for 
automatic dismissal were set at s. Similarly, FNL|L¯ (s) denotes a CDF of 
signal values for false-negative cases, truly liable cases that would 
automatically be dismissed under a claim-screening mechanism given 
a threshold of s. Thus, it represents the proportion of false negatives. 
In this illustration, FNL|NL¯¯  (s) is strictly above FNL|L¯ (s). This reflects 
the intuition that, even if the signal is somewhat noisy, truly not liable 
cases are more likely to produce low signals than truly liable cases. 
The curves meet at 0 and 1 because, if the thresholds were set at these 
extremes, either none or all of the cases—both the truly not liable and 
truly liable cases—would be dismissed automatically. 
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Figure 1: Pro-Defendant Claim Screening 
 
 
To measure the benefits and costs of claim screening for the 
hypothetical set of cases in the illustration, we must consider how 
these cases would be resolved in the status quo absent claim 
screening. We use pL|L¯  to represent the probability that liability 
would be found in a truly liable case, and pL|NL¯¯   represents the 
probability that liability would be found in a truly not liable case. In 
the illustration, pL|L¯  > pL|NL¯¯   and are invariant to s (for simplicity). 
The dashed lines represent the respective CDFs multiplied by the 
corresponding trial outcome. Thus, FNL|NL¯¯  (s)pL|NL¯¯   represents the 
proportion of truly not liable cases that would automatically (and 
correctly) be dismissed under a claim-screening mechanism if the 
threshold for automatic dismissal were set at s but that would have 
resulted in an incorrect finding of liability in the absence of claim 
screening. Similarly, FNL|L¯ (s)pL|L¯  represents the proportion of truly 
liable cases that would automatically (and incorrectly) be dismissed 
under a claim-screening mechanism if the threshold for automatic 
dismissal were set at s and that would have correctly resulted in a 
finding of liability in the absence of claim screening. 
These curves thus represent the benefit and the cost of claim 
screening, respectively. The benefit of claim screening is that it 
reduces the number of false liability findings. Accordingly, FNL|NL¯¯  
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(s)pL|NL¯¯   signifies the cases resolved correctly under claim screening 
but incorrectly under the status quo. The cost of claim screening is 
that it reduces the number of correct liability findings. FNL|L¯ (s)pL|L¯  
captures this cost by showing the cases resolved incorrectly under 
claim screening but correctly under the status quo. The heights of the 
curves illustrate the benefits and costs for particular signal thresholds 
for pro-defendant claim screening. That threshold is set at 0.30 (which 
is where the slopes of the dotted lines are equal and thus the optimal 
value for the set of cases illustrated in Figure 1). The amount FNL|NL¯¯  
(s)pL|NL¯¯   represents the benefits of pro-defendant claim screening 
(reduced false positives). The amount FNL|L¯ (s)pL|L¯  represents the costs 
of pro-defendant claim screening (increased false negatives). The 
difference between the heights of these two curves represents the net 
benefit of pro-defendant claim screening, and the optimal threshold 
occurs where this net benefit is maximized. 
Figure 2 extends Figure 1 to illustrate the potential benefits of 
pro-plaintiff claim screening for the same set of cases, where the 
plaintiff automatically wins if a signal exceeds a particular value. We 
define FL|L¯ (s) = 1 ? FNL|L¯ (s), and we define FL|NL¯¯  (s) = 1 ? FNL|NL¯¯  (s). 
Thus, FL|L¯ (s) represents the proportion of the truly liable cases that 
would result in an automatic liability determination if the threshold 
for pro-plaintiff screening were set at s, and FL|NL¯¯  (s) represents the 
corresponding proportion of the truly not liable cases. We then define 
pNL|L¯   = 1 ? pL|L¯  and pNL|NL¯¯    = 1 ? pL|NL¯¯  . Note that FL|L¯ (s) is above 
FL|NL¯¯  (s) because the truly liable cases will generally produce higher 
signal values. 
 
1 - Abramowicz PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/15/2013  9:41 AM 
1652 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:6:1641 
Figure 2: Pro-Defendant and Pro-Plaintiff Claim Screening 
 
The dotted lines represent the benefit and cost of pro-plaintiff 
claim screening. FL|L¯ (s) pNL|L¯  represents the truly liable cases that 
will be resolved automatically (and correctly) for the plaintiff under 
pro-plaintiff screening but would have been resolved incorrectly in 
court, and FL|NL¯¯  (s)pNL|NL¯¯   represents the truly not liable cases that 
will be resolved automatically (and incorrectly) for the plaintiff but 
would have been resolved correctly in court. The heights of the red 
dotted lines thus represent the benefit (reduced false negatives) and 
the cost (increased false positives) of pro-plaintiff claim screening with 
this threshold. The difference between the two pro-plaintiff dotted 
lines represents the net benefit of pro-plaintiff claim screening. The 
optimal signal threshold here is set at 0.52. 
This graphical analysis, of course, does not prove that claim 
screening will always be optimal. The particular CDFs and 
probabilities are, after all, arbitrarily chosen. Indeed, even with these 
curves, a conclusion that claim screening produces net benefits reflects 
two premises: first, that the number of truly liable and truly not liable 
cases are equal, and second, that the costs of false positives and false 
negatives are equal. We will return to these assumptions in our formal 
analysis. The graph, nonetheless, usefully illustrates two intuitions: 
First, when even a noisy signal is sufficiently near the extremes of the 
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probability distribution, the chance that the signal is misleading is 
relatively low, and the danger that claim screening will lead to bad 
results is relatively low as well. The second is that the optimal claim 
screening thresholds need not be symmetric and will depend on the 
shape of the CDFs. 
B. A Model Without Trial Costs 
As above, consider a set of cases in which the correct finding is 
either “liability” (denoted L¯ ) or “no liability” (denoted NL¯¯  ). For either 
type of case, the court system may find liability with one of two 
probability values: pL|low and pL|hi, where pL|low < pL|hi. The probability 
p ? [pL|low, pL|hi] may be thought of as the proportion of judges who 
would impose liability. (In the simulations of Part III, we allow for a 
distribution of probabilities.) Let pNL|low = 1 ? pL|low and 
pNL|hi = 1 ? pL|hi. Let ?low|L¯  ? [0,1] represent the proportion of truly 
liable cases that have a probability of a liability finding at court of 
pL|low. The remaining share ?hi|L¯  = (1 ? ?low|L¯ ) of truly liable cases has 
a probability of a liability finding pL|hi in each case. Let ?low|NL¯¯   ? [0,1] 
be the share of truly not liable cases that have a pL|low probability of a 
liability finding at court. This means a share ?hi|NL¯¯   = (1 ? ?low|NL¯¯  ) will 
have a probability pL|hi of a liability finding. This notation is 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of Cases with Each Probability of Liability 
Finding Within Truly Liable and Truly Not Liable Cases 
  
 


















?hi|L¯  = (1 ? ?low|L¯ ) 
 
 
Truly not liable 
 
 




?hi|NL¯¯   = (1 ? ?low|NL¯¯  ) 
 
The only assumption we make about the accuracy of the court 
is that truly not liable cases have the lower probability of liability at 
court than truly liable cases. Specifically, we assume ?low|NL¯¯   ? ?low|L¯ . 
Note that these assumptions are fairly general. They accommodate 
both a perfect court (i.e., ?low|NL¯¯   = 1, ?low|L¯  = 0, pL|low = 0, pL|hi = 1), as 
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well as a completely uninformed court in which the probability of a 
liability finding bears no relation to the correct finding (i.e., ?low|NL¯¯  
 = ?low|L¯ , pL|low = pL|hi ). 
As a baseline we first define the total expected social costs of 
court errors in the status quo. Let ? represent the share of cases that 
are truly liable. Let the cost for a false no-liability finding equal cNL|L¯ . 
Because pNL|low and pNL|hi are the proportions of judges who would find 
no liability for the groups of cases with a low and high probability of 
finding liability, respectively, the expected error cost from false no-
liability findings is ?cNL|L¯ (?low|L¯ pNL|low + ?hi|L¯  pNL|hi). Assume a cost of 
cL|NL¯¯   per case that imposes false liability. The expected error cost from 
false-liability findings in the status quo is (1 ? ?)cL|NL¯¯  (?low|NL¯¯  
pL|low + ?hi|NL¯¯  pL|hi).The expected costs of errors in the status quo can 
be expressed as: 
(1) ? ? ? ?hiLNLhilowLNLlowhiNLLhilowNLLlowSQ ppppAEC |||||||| ???? ????  
where A is a constant term equal to ? ? NLLLNL cc || 1 ?? ? , representing the 
relative expected cost of false no-liability findings to false liability 
findings. 
The first term in (1) is the expected cost of the false no-liability 
findings and the second term is the expected cost of false liability 
findings. For now, we focus on the benchmark case in which A = 1 (i.e., 
where the relative expected costs of false no-liability and false liability 
findings are equal). In particular, this covers the situation in which 
there are an equal number of truly liable and truly not liable cases, 
and the cost of each type of erroneous finding is equal. Later we 
discuss the importance of the value of A and the implications of 
relaxing this assumption. 
Suppose we observe neither the correct liability decision nor 
whether the value of p is pL|low or pL|hi (the court’s likelihood of finding 
liability, correctly or not) but instead observe a noisy signal s ? [0,1] 
that contains information about p. For instance, this signal may be the 
interest rate charged in a third-party financing arrangement. A higher 
interest rate indicates a lower probability of a liability finding and 
damage recovery. We imagine a claim-screening policy parameterized 
by a pair of thresholds t1 ? t2. Under this policy, cases with s observed 
below t1 are automatically dismissed, those with s above t2 are 
automatically found liable, and those with s between t1 and t2 proceed 
to trial as in the status quo. 
In Lemma 1, we present necessary and sufficient conditions on 
the conditional distributions of a noisy signal s such that a claim-
screening policy will reduce error costs. To preview the results, a 
signal reduces court error if and only if the signal has greater odds 
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than the court of reaching the correct finding among the subset of 
cases that are screened out. The conditions are equivalent to a 
specification in our graphical illustrations above in that the height of 
the benefits curve exceeds the costs curve, for some thresholds. Part (i) 
of the claim applies to the lower tail of the signal distribution (cases 
that are automatically dismissed) and (ii) applies to the upper tail 
(cases that are found automatically liable). Part (iii) says that if each 
tail taken alone has a cost-reducing claim-screening policy, then a 
policy that screens out cases on both tails using each threshold does 
even better. Here we present an intuitive statement of the lemma. The 
formal statement and proof are presented in the Appendix. 
Lemma 1: If (1) the relative costs of false liability and false no-
liability findings are equal, and (2) courts satisfy a minimal condition 
of aggregate accuracy, namely, that courts are more likely than not to 
find no liability in truly not liable cases and liability in truly liable 
cases, the following hold: 
(i) a beneficial pro-defendant claim-screening threshold exists if claim screening 
overturns more status quo liability findings among low-probability cases (i.e., cases 
more likely to have a correct outcome of not liable) than among high-probability cases 
(i.e., cases more likely to have a correct outcome of liable). 
(ii) a beneficial pro-plaintiff claim-screening threshold exists if claim screening 
overturns more status quo no-liability findings among high-probability cases than 
among low probability cases. 
(iii) both pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff claim-screening thresholds are beneficial if 
both (i) and (ii) hold. 
The critical conditions (i) and (ii) are cost-benefit criteria. 
Consider expression (4) in the Appendix. On the benefit side of the 
ledger for pro-defendant claim screening are cases with low 
probabilities of liability, because (?low|NL¯¯   ? ?low|L¯ )pL|lowFNL|low(t1) is 
positive. This follows from the fact that truly not liable cases outweigh 
truly liable cases among those with pL|low (i.e., ?low|NL¯¯   > ?low|L¯ ). This 
benefit must be balanced against the expected cost from applying pro-
defendant claim screening to cases with a high probability of liability, 
which sometimes also generate low signals and trigger automatic 
dismissal. For this group there is a net cost because truly liable cases 
outnumber truly not liable cases. Condition (i) says claim screening 
overturns more status quo liability findings among low-probability 
cases (pL|lowFNL|low(t1)) than among high-probability cases 
(pL|hiFNL|hi(t1)). If this is so, then the benefits of pro-defendant claim 
screening exceed the costs. 
The key question is when these conditions are met so that some 
form of claim screening is appropriate. How likely are conditions (i) 
and (ii) to be satisfied by some signal available to the court? We next 
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present a corollary to the preceding claim illustrating a general set of 
signals satisfying these conditions. All that is required is that the 
signals be sufficiently informative near the extremes of the 
distribution. 
The particular signal we consider is a weighted average of the 
(unobserved) probability of a liability finding by the court (either pL|low 
or pL|hi in any given case) and a random variable r uniformly 
distributed on [0,1]. As the weight on r approaches 1, the signal 
approaches pure noise. We show that for any signal strength, there 
are always thresholds at which claims should be screened. For any 
positive value of the weight w on the true probability, no matter how 
small, there will be some range of signal values at the extremes (i.e., 
near 0 and 1) which reveal the true underlying probability of liability 
for the case at hand. Because we assume ?low|NL¯¯   > ?low|L¯ , a minimum 
requirement of aggregate judicial accuracy, screening out claims based 
on such a signal will reduce the cost of errors. Here we provide an 
intuitive statement of this claim and present the formal statement 
and proof in the Appendix. 
Claim 1: Consider any signal that is a weighted average of the 
court’s probability of finding liability and a pure statistical noise term. 
Assume false liability findings and false no-liability findings are 
equally costly. Then claim screening based on such a signal yields net 
benefits. 
Figure 3 graphically illustrates such a signal, for a value of w 
such that some cases with intermediate signal values (between v1 and 
v2) proceed to trial. If we think of the signal value as the interest rate 
on a third-party financing arrangement, a high interest rate would be 
associated with a lower probability of a liability finding, hence a low 
signal value. Under a claim-screening regime, interest rates above a 
certain threshold would be automatically dismissed. 
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Figure 3: Example of a Signal v Where Extreme Cases 
Are Screened Out 
 
 
Recall that A represents the relative importance of false no-
liability findings to false liability findings. The greater the value of A, 
all else equal, the less likely we are to see net benefits from the 
automatic dismissal of cases below a given threshold. At the same 
time, greater values for A should increase the net benefit from finding 
automatic liability above a given threshold. If the expected cost of 
false liability increases relative to false no liability, we would need 
more accurate signals as the basis upon which to dismiss claims 
automatically. Likewise, we would tolerate less accurate signals upon 
which to base automatic liability findings. We have already seen that 
for A = 1, both pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff claim screening can 
reduce costs relative to the status quo. In Claim 2, we use the specific 
signal considered earlier to show that for any arbitrary value of A, at 
least one of the two types of claim screening will always reduce error 
costs relative to the status quo. Here we state Claim 2 intuitively and 
present the formal statement and proof in the Appendix. 
Claim 2: Consider any signal that is a weighted average of the 
court’s probability of finding liability and a pure statistical noise term. 
Then for any relative weighting of the costs of false liability findings 
and false no-liability findings, either pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff 
claim screening (or both) reduces error costs relative to the status quo. 
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C. A Model with Trial Costs 
The analysis thus far has assumed zero court costs. In general, 
the existence of court costs requires two modifications to our model. 
First, court costs under the status quo can lead some cases at the 
extremes—cases whose expected net benefits from going to trial are 
negative—to be dropped. Second, error costs should be adjusted to 
reflect the net difference between what defendants and plaintiffs 
actually pay and receive, respectively, and what they should optimally 
pay and receive. For instance, some of the error associated with 
finding a defendant falsely not liable may be offset if the defendant 
still has to pay substantial court costs. 
The result of the first effect, other things being equal, is to 
reduce the potential savings from any given claim-screening policy. 
This is because as court costs increase, more cases at the extremes 
would be dropped anyway under the status quo. Indeed, in the 
extreme case where costs are so high that no cases go to court in the 
status quo, all cases would be dropped or settled in favor of the likely 
winner, and claim screening would offer no additional benefit. In a 
sense, increasing litigation costs when an objective signal of the 
likelihood of liability is available is an indirect way of screening 
claims. Deriving conditions under which a beneficial claim-screening 
policy exists requires taking this effect into account. Rather than 
repeating the exercise of Lemma 1 for the case of nonzero court costs, 
in this Section we assume such a policy exists and study how its 
thresholds might change in response to changes in court costs. We will 
show that the optimal thresholds increase in response to higher court 
costs, and that the first effect of higher court costs (more cases 
dropped in the status quo) is irrelevant to this response. The more 
cases that are dropped in the status quo due to higher court costs, the 
less claim screening reduces errors relative to the status quo. Of 
course, more cases dropped in the status quo may mean that the 
amount by which claim screening reduces errors (relative to the status 
quo) may decrease when court costs are higher. 
Assume for simplicity that each party incurs fixed court costs K 
in the event of a trial. The total cost associated with erroneous 
liability and no-liability findings are cL|NL¯¯   and cNL|L¯  (as before). 
However, we must now interpret these costs more specifically. In a 
truly not liable case, we assume the optimal outcome is for the 
defendant to pay nothing and the plaintiff to receive nothing. 
Similarly, in a truly liable case, the defendant should pay D and the 
plaintiff should receive D. To measure the error cost associated with 
any given pair of payments, we add the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s 
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absolute deviations from their optimal payments.17 For instance, in a 
truly not liable case that goes to court and is incorrectly found liable, 
the defendant pays D + K and the plaintiff receives D ? K. The optimal 
payments to/from each party in this case are zero, so (because we have 
assumed D > K) the total deviation from the optimum is 2D. As 
another example, court costs can introduce errors even in cases that 
are decided correctly. If a truly not liable case is correctly found not 
liable at court, both the defendant and plaintiff still pay K, resulting 
in a total deviation of 2K from the optimal payments. To preserve 
comparison with the case of zero court costs, we define cL|NL¯¯   and cNL|L¯  
as the costs of deviations of magnitude 2D in truly not liable and truly 
liable cases, respectively. Accordingly, errors for other outcomes can 
be expressed (in proportion with their magnitudes) in terms of cL|NL¯¯   
and cNL|L¯ . 
Table 2 summarizes the total errors associated with different 
findings in each type of case. Note that the errors for cases with 
incorrect findings are independent of court costs, because court costs 
reduce the error for one party by exactly the same amount they 
increase it for the other party. Court costs matter only for cases with 
correct findings. In these cases, court costs increase overall error costs 
by distorting the payments of both parties away from their optimal 
levels. 
 
Table 2: Error Costs of Outcomes in the Presence of Court 






















Truly not liable 
 
 
cL|NL¯¯   
 




 17. The optimal amounts a defendant should pay and a plaintiff should receive would 
generally flow from a larger model focusing on some specific litigation context, such as 
minimizing the overall costs of accidents, and need not be equal in magnitude. To simplify the 
discussion, we have assumed equal penalties for deviations from what the defendant should pay 
and deviations from what the plaintiff should receive.   
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As before, given each (unobserved) potential probability of 
liability p ? {pL|low, pL|hi}, we have a signal s of the underlying 
probability of liability, with cumulative distribution FNL|p(s). We 
assume that the plaintiff, defendant, and court share the same signal. 
(We leave the case of asymmetric information to the simulation model 
in the next part.) A plaintiff will drop any suit for which the expected 
gain from going to trial (the expected probability of winning, based on 
signal s, times the damage amount) is less than the court costs. More 
formally, a plaintiff will drop any suit for which the signal s is such 
that E(p|s) < K/D. The signal is useful to the parties, even in the 
status quo, because they are able to update the probability that the 
court will find liability to the appropriate value between pL|low and 
pL|hi. A defendant will pay full damages for any signal s such that 
E(p|s) > (1 ? K/D).18 When the parties observe a signal value s (for 
instance, an interest rate on a third-party financing arrangement), 
they can calculate the implied probability of a court finding liability. 
To simplify notation, we therefore normalize realizations of the signal 
s to equal the expectation of p that they imply. Therefore pL|low < s < 
pL|hi . 
We will analyze nontrivial claim-screening policies given by 
(t1*, t2*) satisfying K/D < t1* < t2* < (1 ? K/D). These policies are 
nontrivial because they screen out some cases that would not have 
been dropped anyway in the status quo. To simplify later notation, let 
Zlow and Zhi represent error costs in correctly adjudicated cases when 
the probability of liability is pL|low and pL|hi, respectively. Recall that A  
is a constant term equal to ? ? NLLLNL cc || 1 ?? ? , representing the relative 
expected cost of false no-liability findings to false liability findings. To 
simplify notation, we express Zlow and Zhi as a function of A, rather 
than the underlying cost terms described in Table 2.  
(7a) 
(7b) 
Let ECCS(t1*, t2*, K) be the expected error costs of a claim-
screening policy with thresholds (t1*, t2*), when court costs at trial are 
K per party. 
 
 18. Note that we assume that litigation in the status quo will involve only positive-
expected-value suits. The results, however, would be strengthened if we allowed for negative-
expected-value suits in the status quo because some of these suits would result in automatic 
findings of no liability. 
? ?lowNLNLlowlowLLlowlow ppAD
KZ |||| ?? ??
? ?hiNLNLhihiLLhihi ppAD
KZ |||| ?? ??
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(8) 
The presence of court costs adds errors only for the subset of 
cases going to trial (the terms with Z). Even when the court reaches 
the correct decision in the status quo, court costs distort the payments 
of each party away from their optimal values. By eliminating this 
small distortion of optimal payments in correctly decided cases, claim 
screening generates an additional benefit relative to the situation in 
which court costs are zero. The next claim shows that the optimal 
claim-screening thresholds, if they exist between K/D and (1 ? K/D), 
move closer together when court costs increase. Once again, we 
provide an intuitive statement here and reserve the formal statement 
and proof for the Appendix. 
Claim 3: Assume we have an optimal claim-screening policy 
characterized by thresholds t1* and t2*. Then any increase in court 
costs implies that the optimal thresholds should move closer together 
(i.e., more cases should be automatically decided rather than going to 
court). 
Higher court costs increase the expected error costs of cases 
going to trial without affecting the error costs of those that are 
screened out. On the margin, it therefore becomes worthwhile to 
screen out more cases. 
To summarize our results in this Section, we have shown that a 
third-party signal, even if statistically noisy, can reduce the overall 
costs of false liability and no-liability findings, so long as (1) judges in 
the aggregate are more likely than not to reach the correct decision 
and (2) the signal is a minimally informative statistical predictor of 
aggregate judicial opinion. A claim-screening mechanism based on 
such a signal would automatically dismiss cases with signals 
indicating a very low probability of liability, find automatic liability in 
cases with signals indicating a very high probability of liability, and 
allow to proceed to trial those cases with intermediate signals. We 
have also shown how such claim-screening policies could be adjusted 
to account for variations in court costs, as well as variations in the 
relative weighting of the costs of false liability and false no-liability 
findings. 
We have abstracted away somewhat from the settlement-
bargaining process, though incorporating it more explicitly would not 
affect the main results. To see how claim screening would adjust to 
the settlement-bargaining process, consider the following example for 
a court with a 5% error rate. In the status quo, if we assume that all 
cases settle for their expected value at court, all the truly liable cases 
will settle for 95% of full damages and all the truly not liable cases 
? ? ? ?)()()()()0,,(),,( *1|*2|*1|*2|*2*1*2*1 tFtFZtFtFZttECKttEC hiNLhiNLhilowNLlowNLlowCSCS ?????
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will settle for 5% of full damages. If we measure error as the deviation 
between what is actually paid and what should be paid (i.e., full 
damages in truly liable cases and no damages in truly not liable 
cases), this means a 5% error in every case, the same overall error rate 
that we obtain in the no-settlement model. Introducing settlement 
aggregates idiosyncratic court error and spreads it evenly across all 
cases but does not reduce it. We still need a claim-screening 
mechanism to eliminate the idiosyncratic errors. Nonetheless, it may 
be useful to incorporate settlement and other features directly into the 
model, both to assess what claim-screening thresholds might be 
plausible and to explore tentatively the robustness of our conclusions. 
We now turn to that task. 
III. SIMULATION MODEL 
Our mathematical model is quite general, showing that there 
are some signals that should trigger claim screening without 
specifying what those signals should be. To obtain a better sense of the 
numbers, we need a more complicated model that incorporates 
settlement. Such a model is not likely to be mathematically tractable, 
however, so we turn to simulation. The heart of the simulation is a 
simple, general litigation model involving a plaintiff and a defendant. 
To calculate each data point on the graphs in the following analysis, 
the computer played this litigation game 50,000 times. In its most 
basic form (we will consider some variations later), the game works as 
follows: The plaintiff sues the defendant for damages D, which are 
assumed to be agreed upon in advance (for simplicity). The actual 
probability that the plaintiff will eventually win the lawsuit, p, is 
drawn from a uniform distribution from 0 to 1. The plaintiff, 
defendant, and a third party each independently estimate this 
probability without bias but with noise, producing estimates pP, pD, 
and pT. The degree of noise depends on the value of noise coefficients 
nP, nD, and nT, respectively.19 
The plaintiff and defendant each calculate the expected value 
of trial based on their respective estimates, EVP and EVD, taking into 
account both the cost of litigation (KP and KD) and the claim-screening 
legal regime. (In the ordinary case, EVP > 0 and EVD < 0.) The case 
 
 19. Each estimate pi = f(p + N(ni)), where N outputs a random number drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation ni, and f(x) is a function that calculates the 
expected value of p for any estimate x biased by adding a random normal deviate, given the 
initial distribution of cases and the particular value of ni. We calculated f(x) using Monte Carlo 
techniques. While it is not necessarily the case that 0 < p + N(ni) < 1, it will always be the case 
that 0 < pi < 1. Note that as ni increases, pi will approach 0.50. 
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will have a settlement range if EVP + EVD < 0. When this is so, the 
case will settle at the midpoint of the settlement range. When it is not, 
then either party may still choose to default; P will default (i.e., drop 
the case) if EVP < 0, and D will default (i.e., accept an adverse 
judgment) if ?EVD > D. If neither party defaults, the case goes to trial. 
A random number r is generated from a uniform distribution from 0 to 
1, and the plaintiff wins the lawsuit if p > r. If the plaintiff wins, the 
defendant pays the plaintiff D. 
A disadvantage of simulation models is that particular values 
have to be chosen for the relevant parameters, and simulation models 
can provide no assurance about generalizability of the results for 
combinations of parameter values not selected. Nonetheless, 
simulation models make it relatively easy to examine the 
consequences of changing both the parameter values and the structure 
of the simulation itself. We thus assigned baseline values for the 
parameters, admittedly with some arbitrariness, and later we will 
consider the effects of changing some of these baseline values. In all 
subsequent simulations, these baseline values are used unless 
otherwise indicated. In particular, we assumed that D = 100 and that 
KP = KD = 15.20 In addition, the baseline simulation set nP = nD = 0.15, 
and nT = 0.25. These noise coefficients correspond to an average 
absolute error in estimating p of about 0.1 for both the plaintiff and 
defendant, and 0.15 for the third party. Whether our estimate of nT is 
plausible depends on the technology used to induce third-party 
estimates, but we believe that this estimate is quite conservative. 
Note that if p = 0.50, then an estimate randomly drawn from a 
uniform distribution between 0.20 and 0.80 would also produce an 
average absolute error of 0.15. 
To measure the effectiveness of the legal system with and 
without claim screening, we calculated average overdeterrence errors 
and average underdeterrence errors. When a defendant pays money 
even though the correct answer would require the defendant to pay 
nothing, the defendant is overdeterred and presumably takes 
excessive precautions. In such a case, the net amount of money spent 
by the defendant counts as the overdeterrence error. When a 
 
 20. We recognize that some empirical studies support a value closer to 25. See Donohue, 
supra note 13, at 201 n.25. We chose a value of 15 largely because with a value of 25, the rate of 
settlement is approximately 0.99 or higher for many of the cases considered, making 
comparisons less interesting. Using a value of 25 would produce an unrealistically high 
settlement rate on this model because of the assumption that the decision to go to trial is made 
once and forever at the outset of litigation. If Donohue’s 25 includes costs that are sunk before a 
commitment to going to trial, we could reconcile the two figures by interpreting 15 as only those 
costs incurred after the decision to go to trial is made. 
1 - Abramowicz PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/15/2013  9:41 AM 
1664 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:6:1641 
defendant pays less than full damages in a case in which the correct 
answer is to pay full damages, the defendant is underdeterred. In such 
a case, the amount by which the defendant’s payments fall short of full 
damages counts as the underdeterrence error. Our measures of the 
defendant’s payments include trial costs. So, for example, if a trial in 
which the defendant should be found liable results in the defendant 
paying $100 in damages, but also $15 for the defendant’s legal 
expenses, the case counts as producing $15 in overdeterrence error 
and $0 in underdeterrence error. In no single case will there be both 
overdeterrence and underdeterrence errors. Note that damages can be 
expressed in terms of over- or undercompensation errors, but using 
the deterrence framework is straightforward. 
Calculating the errors requires an assumption about what 
answer is correct in a particular case. Our baseline assumption is that 
the probability that a position is correct is equal to the proportion of 
decisionmakers who would adopt that position. Thus, when the 
random number generator draws p = 0.25 from a uniform distribution, 
there is a 0.25 probability that the plaintiff should win and a 0.75 
probability that the defendant should win. The simulation thus 
performs an additional random number generation to choose between 
these possibilities. Thus, 75% of the time, the simulation will assume 
that the correct legal answer is for the defendant to win and pay 
nothing, and 25% of the time, the simulation will assume that the 
correct answer is for the plaintiff to win and receive D from the 
defendant. We will, however, relax this assumption later, considering 
both the possibility that majorities are disproportionately correct (so 
that when 90% of judges would rule for D, there is greater than a 0.9 
probability that this is the correct answer) and the possibility that 
majorities are not quite proportionately correct (so that when 90% of 
judges would rule for D, there is less than a 0.90 probability that this 
is the correct answer). 
For most of the simulations reported here, the results for 
overdeterrence error and underdeterrence error were qualitatively 
similar, although overdeterrence error was systematically somewhat 
higher as a result of legal fees. We thus simply report the sum of these 
measures,21 denoted “error costs,” recognizing that in some legal 
 
 21. The sum, not the difference, is the appropriate measure. Underdeterrence and 
overdeterrence costs do not cancel out because the costs occur in different cases. Consider a tort 
system that imposed no damages on a defendant in a case in which the defendant should have 
taken a precaution and then imposed damages on a defendant in a case in which the defendant 
should not have taken and did not take a precaution. This legal system will not produce 
appropriate incentives to take precautions, regardless of whether the defendant in the two cases 
1 - Abramowicz PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/15/2013  9:41 AM 
2013] SCREENING LEGAL CLAIMS 1665 
contexts, the welfare consequences of a marginal dollar in 
overdeterrence may differ from the consequences of a marginal dollar 
in underdeterrence. This measure provides a proxy for the overall 
inaccuracy of the legal system. The measure is not, however, a general 
measure of the total welfare consequences of the legal system, which 
also depend on the trial costs. Although trial costs may affect 
deterrence error—for example, by increasing the extent of 
overdeterrence—they also have direct welfare consequences. 
A. Change in Signal Strength 
We begin by considering how claim screening affects error costs 
in the baseline case and when the third party receives two signals of 
variant strengths. The two alternative values for nT are 0.15 (a 
relatively strong signal providing the third party a forecasting ability 
equal to that of each of the parties) and 0.35 (a very weak signal). For 
each of the signals, we consider different thresholds beyond which the 
plaintiff and the defendant would automatically win. We use 
symmetrical thresholds, such as 0.10 for pro-defendant claim 
screening and 0.90 for pro-plaintiff claim screening. A threshold of 0 
for the plaintiff and 1 for the defendant is equivalent to a regime of no 
claim screening, and a threshold of 0.50 for each party is equivalent to 
a regime in which all claims are resolved on the basis of the third-
party estimate. We assume in these simulations that the claim 
screening takes place before any settlement negotiations.22 
Figure 4 illustrates the results. The x-axis reports the 
threshold for determining whether the plaintiff automatically wins; in 
all simulations, the corresponding threshold for whether the 
defendant automatically wins was equal to (1 ? “plaintiff threshold”). 
Unsurprisingly, error is lower with the stronger signal. More 
surprisingly, the analysis suggests that the optimal thresholds are 
relatively close to 0.50—that is, a relatively large number of cases 
should be automatically screened to minimize the absolute error. 
Optimal thresholds fall between (0.50, 0.50) and (0.40, 0.60) for both 
 
happens to be the same party. The party will have an incentive to take an inefficient precaution 
and not to take an efficient one.  
 22. Had we not adopted this assumption, the simulation would have required an initial round 
of settlement negotiations in which each party estimates the probability that the third party will 
announce a value above or below the threshold. We anticipate that social welfare results would 
be similar, though not quite as dramatic, in a regime in which settlement could occur before 
claim screening. Litigants would recognize that relatively frivolous claims would very likely be 
dismissed even before trial, thus dramatically reducing the danger of an idiosyncratic 
decisionmaker at trial, but defendants might still agree to very low settlements for low-
probability claims. 
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the baseline case and the strong signal, and between (0.40, 0.60) and 
(0.35, 0.65) for the weak signal. Note that screening out cases at the 
ends of the probability continuum makes almost no difference, because 
many such cases settle anyway, and it is rare for the signal to be quite 
that strong. 
 
Figure 4: Effect of Third-Party Signal Strength 
 
The basic shape of the error-costs curves does not change when 
we alter the strength of the parties’ signals. Figure 5 again illustrates 
the baseline case, along with cases for which the parties’ signal 
strengths are strong (nP = nD = 0.05) or weak (nP = nD = 0.25), holding 
constant the third parties’ signal strength. With the strong signal, 
error costs decline modestly from signal thresholds of (0.50, 0.50) to 
(0.35, 0.65) before rising markedly and then moving toward the ends 
of the probability continuum. This is because all cases with a strong 
signal settle, reducing a principal benefit of claim screening 
(eliminating the error costs associated with the costs of trial itself). We 
also tested the case in which only one party’s signal is stronger or 
weaker, increasing the asymmetry of the parties’ information. 
However, because the resulting curves are almost identical to Figure 
5, although a bit closer together toward the right end of the graph, we 
do not include the chart separately here. 
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Figure 5: Effect of Party Signal Strength 
 
B. Trial Costs 
We also altered our assumptions about the level of trial costs. 
We tested a high trial-cost case (KP = KD = 25) and a low trial-cost case 
(KP = KD = 5). As Figure 6 illustrates, these variations had almost no 
effect on the shape of the error-costs curves (even though the changes 
had predictable effects on settlement rates in unscreened cases). 
Varying only one party’s trial costs had almost no effect; the graph 
illustrating this is also omitted. 
1 - Abramowicz PAGE (Do Not Delete) 11/15/2013  9:41 AM 
1668 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:6:1641 
 
Figure 6: Effect of Parties’ Trial Costs 
 
C. Majoritarian Correctness 
The analysis so far has assumed that the probability that the 
plaintiff should win equals p. Yet the probability that the plaintiff 
should win could be more or less than that. We thus considered two 
alternative conditions, the “majorities-strong” condition and the 
“majorities-weak” condition, as illustrated in Figure 7. When 
majorities are strong, the fact that a majority agrees on who should 
win provides greater reason to believe in that outcome than when 
majorities are weak. The probability that the plaintiff should win is 
set equal to 0.50[1 ? 2(0.50?p)]? for p ? 0.50 and equal to 
1 ? 0.50[1 ? 2(p?0.5)]? for p > 0.50. In the majorities-strong condition, 
? = 2, and in the majorities-weak condition, ? = 0.50. For example, in 
the cases in which the plaintiff will win with 0.75 probability, the 
majorities-strong condition indicates the plaintiff should win with 0.88 
probability and the majorities-weak condition indicates the plaintiff 
should win with .65 probability. Error costs are highest overall in the 
majorities-weak condition, because the court system in that condition 
is least likely to reach the correct result. Neither the majorities-weak 
nor the majorities-strong condition, however, has much effect on the 
optimum values of the signal thresholds or on the shape of the error-
costs curve. 
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Figure 7: Effect of Majoritarian Correctness 
 
D. Costliness of the Signal 
Our analyses so far have assumed that the third-party signal is 
costless. This may make sense if the signal is the result of gatekeeping 
by a litigation finance company that would have occurred anyway. But 
in other situations, procuring a signal will be costly; if one or both 
parties bear the cost, that cost must be taken into account in 
evaluating the effectiveness of the legal system. The transaction costs 
matter both in and of themselves and because they might affect 
deterrence error. If the plaintiff alone bears the cost of the signal, that 
will not affect the effectiveness of underdeterrence or overdeterrence. 
Because our analysis assumes that the universe of cases is determined 
exogenously, we do not consider the possibility that plaintiffs might 
not bring some relatively low-probability-of-success cases at all as a 
result of the cost of the signal. Thus, for analytical thoroughness, we 
adopt the reverse assumption, that the defendant must bear the cost 
of the signal. 
Figure 8 assesses the effect of changing the cost of the third-
party signal, assuming that the defendant bears the cost in each of the 
three regimes. The quality of the signal is constant; this figure 
assesses only the extent to which different possible costs of obtaining a 
signal of baseline quality might impact deterrence error. The low-cost 
signal costs the defendant 5, and the high-cost signal costs the 
defendant 15 (equal to each party’s trial costs). The cost of the signal 
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has only a slight effect when there is no claim screening (at the far 
right of the figure). Here, the vast majority of cases settle at some 
compromise value, and the extra cost imposed on the defendant is 
about as likely to make up for underdeterrence as it is to exacerbate 
overdeterrence. When claim screening is used, however, the high-cost 
signal substantially increases error costs near thresholds of (0.50, 
0.50) and reduces the benefits of claim screening. If claim screening 
costs the defendant as much as a trial, then, from the perspective of 
optimizing deterrence, it makes sense to preserve the trial for close 
cases. With the low-cost signal, however, claim screening is still 
optimized at thresholds around (0.40, 0.60). The intuition is that claim 
screening is likely to reduce error costs only if the cost of the signal is 
less than the cost of trial, because much of the deterrence value of 
claim screening arises from the reduction of trial costs. Because the 
goal of claim screening is only to produce a noisy signal of the expected 
trial value, this should generally be achievable. 
 
Figure 8: Effect of Costly Signal 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The mathematical and simulation analyses presented here 
suggest that if a signal of case quality is available and sufficiently 
strong, it may often make sense to resolve a case conclusively on the 
basis of that signal. The mathematical model does not indicate how 
strong the signal must be to justify claim screening, but the 
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simulation model seems to indicate that with an unbiased signal, 
claim screening may be optimally beneficial for cases with 
probabilities of victory roughly below 0.40 or above 0.60. In the context 
of litigation finance, this suggests that the plaintiff should be allowed 
to seek third-party financing only if the financing company agrees to 
offer fee shifting at a level that would lead the financing company to 
screen out cases where it believes that the plaintiff has less than a 
0.40 probability of winning. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine just what the 
optimal fee-shifting level is, but a basic regime in which the fees are 
shifted seems unlikely to screen claims in which the plaintiff has a 
higher probability of winning than that. Even with fee shifting, many 
cases will settle. Assuming that only 80% of cases settle, if the 
plaintiff prevails in 40% of the remaining 20% of cases (thus, 8%), the 
expected cost of fee shifting would be only approximately 4% of legal 
fees (12% ? 8%), and this assumes further that the other party agrees 
to the offer of fee shifting. As long as the average interest payment 
from the plaintiff exceeds this level in the remaining 80% of cases, the 
investment is still a beneficial one. It thus seems likely that a 
requirement forcing a litigation finance company to agree to fee 
shifting would produce a relatively small amount of claim screening, 
less than would be socially optimal. Thus, such a requirement would 
likely increase welfare relative to a regime in which litigation finance 
is offered without restriction. Over time, more dramatic screening 
mechanisms, such as double fee shifting, might be employed. 
Our analysis also suggests that claim screening might be used 
in other cases, even if the mechanism is costly. Although we recognize 
that claim screening is a more radical change to the legal process than 
mere regulation of litigation finance, which would likely encounter 
due process and other objections, our analysis suggests that it could be 
beneficial. One possible approach would be to require all parties to 
obtain litigation finance in a way that ensures that the party’s chance 
of prevailing exceeds some threshold. While it seems unlikely that 
such a requirement would be grafted onto the legal system, one can 
imagine more incremental change, first by regulating litigation 
finance and later by requiring litigation finance in cases in which 
there is reason to suspect that the plaintiff’s case is weak. 
Judges already make preliminary assessments under existing 
claim-screening mechanisms, such as the dismissal of a case for 
failure to state a claim23 and issuance of summary judgment.24 In 
 
 23. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  
 24. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
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theory, these mechanisms are not explicitly probabilistic in nature. 
They generally ask whether the plaintiff would prevail if the facts are 
as claimed and whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material 
fact.” The summary judgment standard has long been seen as only 
requiring parties to meet their burdens of production.25 Recent 
Supreme Court cases have given judges more flexibility to dismiss 
cases that they view as relatively unlikely to prevail.26 Thus, in 
practice, judges may sometimes dismiss or issue summary judgment 
in cases where the evidence on a dispositive issue is extremely one-
sided. To the extent this is so, our model may approximate existing 
practices. Moreover, our model suggests a potential compromise 
between those who believe that giving judges more flexibility to grant 
summary judgment is beneficial and those who believe that judges are 
poorly equipped to make probabilistic judgments of this sort. Judges 
could be given great flexibility to dismiss cases on summary judgment, 
but parties whose cases are dismissed would subsequently have the 
opportunity to obtain litigation financing under a contract if terms 
imply a reasonable chance of victory. Thus, litigation finance would be 
required only in cases in which a judge doubted a party’s case. Our 
purpose has not been to identify precisely the situations in which 
litigation finance would be required, or in which preexisting litigation 
finance contracts would be used to determine whether claims should 
be screened. But our analysis has shown that claim screening based 
on a signal might be beneficial, and litigation finance agreements, 




 25. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (elaborating on the burden-
shifting framework). 
 26. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (detailing a court’s authority to dismiss a 
complaint that offers only conclusions and finding that pleadings require more than a “the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 
(2007) (holding that a complaint requires some factual matter, whereas a bare assertion of 
conspiracy is insufficient to meet the pleading standard). 
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V. APPENDIX 
In this appendix we present the formal statements and proofs 
of the claims in the mathematical section of the paper. 
Lemma 1: Let A = 1. Let ?low|L¯  and ?low|NL¯¯   be the proportion of 
truly liable and not liable cases, respectively, that have a pL|low 
probability of a liability finding at court. The remaining cases in each 
group have a pL|hi probability of a liability finding at court. Assume 
?low|NL¯¯   > ?low|L¯ . Let s ? [0,1] be a signal of a court’s (unobserved) 
probability of finding liability in a given case p ? {pL|low, pL|hi}. Assume 
this signal has cumulative conditional distribution functions 
F(s|pi), i ? {L|low,L|hi}. To simplify notation, denote 
F(s|pL|low) = FNL|low(s) and F(s|pL|hi) = FNL|hi(s). Define 
FL|low(s) = 1 ? FNL|low(s) and FL|hi(s) = 1 ? FNL|hi(s). Denote the total 
error cost of a claim-screening policy with lower threshold t1 and upper 
threshold t2 as ECcs(t1,t2) with 0 < t1 < t2 < 1. According to such a 
policy, cases with s < t1 are automatically dismissed, those with s > t2 
are automatically liable, and those with t1 ? s ? t2 are adjudicated as in 
the status quo. Consider the following conditions: 
(2a) There exists 0 < s1 such that 
pL|lowFNL|low(s1) > pL|hiFNL|hi(s1) 
(2b) There exists s2 < 1 such that 
pNL|lowFL|low(s2) < pNL|hiFL|hi(s2) 
Then: 
(i) a claim-screening policy (t1*,1) exists such that ECCS(t1*,1) < ECSQ if and only if (2a) 
holds 
(ii) a claim-screening policy (0, t2*) exists such that ECCS(0, t2*) < ECSQ if and only if 
(2b) holds 
(iii) for any policies in (i) and (ii) such that 0 < t1* < t2* < 1, the combined policy (t1*, 
t2*) satisfies ECCS (t1*, t2*) < ECCS (0, t2*) and ECCS (t1*, t2*) < ECCS (t1*,1) 
Proof: Under a given claim-screening policy (t1, t2), expected 





The first term in (3) represents false, automatic no-liability findings, 
the second term represents false, automatic liability findings, the 
third term represents mistakes at trial for low-probability-of-liability 
cases, and the fourth term represents mistakes at trial for high-
probability-of-liability cases. To show (i), note that the difference in 
error costs ECSQ ? ECCS(t1,1) can be expressed as:  
(4)  
 
? ? ? ?
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Condition (2a) implies that this expression is positive for some 
s1 = t1. To establish the existence of a claim-screening policy, let 
t1* = s1. Now suppose we have such a cost-reducing claim-screening 
policy. This means (4) is positive for t1 = t1*. Then letting s1 = t1* 
establishes (2a). The proof for (ii) is similar and is omitted. Finally, to 
show (iii), note that ECSQ ? ECCS(t1*,1) = ECCS(0, t2*) ? ECCS(t1*, t2*) 
and ECSQ ? ECCS(0, t2*) = ECCS(t1*,1) ? ECCS(t1*, t2*).? 
Claim 1: Define the signal v = wp + (1 ? w)r, where p ? {pL|low, 
pL|hi}, w is an arbitrary weighting parameter satisfying 0 < w < 1, and 
r is a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then any such 
signal satisfies conditions (2a) and (2b) of Lemma 1, and there exist 
thresholds for which claim screening reduces costs relative to the 
status quo. 
Proof: Because r is uniformly distributed on [0,1], v, itself a 
function of r, is also a random variable uniformly distributed on [wp, 
wp + (1 ? w)]. Letting p equal each of its two possible values (pL|low and 
pL|hi) we can express the two conditional cumulative (uniform) 
distribution functions for v as FNL|low(v) = (v ? wpL|low) / (1 ? w) for v 
?[wpL|low, wpL|low + (1 ? w)], and FNL|hi(v) = (v ? wpL|hi) / (1 ? w) where 
v ?[wpL|hi, wpL|hi+(1?w)]. 
Assume without loss of generality that the two conditional 
CDFs overlap, so that wpL|hi < [wpL|low + (1 – w)]. Define the claim-
screening thresholds as (v1, v2) = (wpL|hi, [wpL|low + (1 ? w)]). We have 
chosen the lower threshold so that any realization v < v1 implies the 
true probability is pL|low. Automatically dismissing all such cases 
would reduce the error cost by pL|low for each truly not liable case but 
increase the error cost by pL|low for each truly liable case, relative to 
the status quo. However, the not liable cases outnumber the liable 
cases among cases with p = pL|low (recall that we assumed A = 1 and 
?low|NL¯¯   > ?low|L¯ ), so the net result is a reduction in error costs from 
claim screening on very low signals. Likewise, when we observe 
signals greater than v2, we know they could have arisen only if the 
case had a probability of liability p = pL|hi. By parallel reasoning, 
finding automatic liability among these cases reduces error costs 
relative to the status quo. Thus, because claim screening improves 
outcomes relative to the status quo for ranges of the signal near 0 and 
1 and does not change the outcomes for all other intermediate values 
of the signals (where cases proceed to trial), error costs are lower 
under this claim-screening policy than under the status quo. ? 
Claim 2: As before, define the signal v = wp + (1 ? w)r, where p 
? {pL|low, pL|hi}, w is an arbitrary weighting parameter satisfying 0 < w 
< 1, and r is a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then, 
for any value of A, (2a) or (2b) (or both) are satisfied. Consequently, 
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either pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff claim screening (or both) reduces 
error costs relative to the status quo. 
Proof: As in Claim 1, define the claim-screening thresholds as 
(v1,v2) = (wpL|hi, [wpL|low + (1 ? w)]). Incorporating A into the 
expression, we now write the difference in error costs from pro-
defendant claim screening ECSQ  ? ECCS (v1,1) as: 
(5) 
Note that when A = 1, this condition reduces to (4), because 
FNL|hi(v1) = 0. The difference in error costs from pro-plaintiff claim 
screening ECSQ – ECCS (0, v2) is: 
(6) 
We wish to show that at least one of the two preceding 
expressions is positive, for any value of A. Under the chosen claim 
screening thresholds, we have FL|low(v2) = FNL|hi(v1) = 0. For the first 
expression to be positive, we must have ?low|NL¯¯   > A?low|L¯ . For the 
second to be positive, we need ?hi|NL¯¯   < A?hi|L¯ . Because ?low|NL¯¯   > ?low|L¯ , 
the first expression is positive for A < ?low|NL¯¯  /?low|L¯  = A1. The second 
expression is positive for A > ?hi|NL¯¯   /?hi|L¯  = A2. Because ?low|NL¯¯   > ?low|L¯ , 
A1 > 1 and A2 < 1. Thus for A < A2, only pro-defendant claim screening 
reduces cost, for A > A1 only pro-plaintiff claim screening reduces cost 
and for A2 < A < A1, both reduce cost. ? 
Claim 3: Assume we have a signal s with twice-differentiable 
conditional distributions FNL|low(s) and FNL|hi(s). Let their respective 
probability density functions be fNL|low(s) and fNL|hi(s). Assume we have 
an optimal (cost-minimizing) claim-screening policy (t1*, t2*) satisfying 
K/D < t1* < t2* < (1?K/D). Also assume that the second-order 
condition for a minimum is satisfied at t1* and t2*, namely that 
d2ECCS/dt12 > 0 and d2ECCS/dt22 > 0. Then an increase in court costs 
implies an increase in t1* and a decrease in t2*. 
Proof : A necessary condition of the optimal claim-screening 
policy (t1*, t2*) is that the first-order conditions with respect to each 
threshold are zero when evaluated at (t1*, t2*). Define G1(t1*,K) and 
G2(t2*,K) as:
? ? ? ? hiLhiNLLhiNLhilowLlowNLLlowNLlow pvFApvFA |1||||1||| )()( ???? ???
? ? ? ? hiNLhiLNLhiLhilowNLlowLNLlowLlow pvFApvFA |2||||2||| )()( ???? ???
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Implicitly differentiating G1(t1*,K) and G2(t2*,K) and using the second-
order condition yields the desired results: dt1*/dK > 0 and dt2*/dK < 
0. ? 
To gain some intuition on this result, consider equation (9). A 
small increase in the threshold for automatically dismissing cases 
means more cases will be dismissed. The first term in the three-term 
expression in equation (9) reflects the change in costs associated with 
an increased number of correctly and incorrectly overturned liability 
findings. This term is independent of court costs. The last two terms 
represent the additional benefits attributable to distorted payments in 
the presence of court costs among cases going to court. The existence 
of these additional benefits always means more cases should be 
screened out when court costs increase. The interpretation of equation 
(10) for the upper threshold is analogous. 
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